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6Foreword
Foreword
Europe	is	often	portrayed	as	a	ship	with	sails	of	different	colours	
from	different	countries	pushing	the	common	boat	in	the	right	
direction.
From	 2010	 to	 2012,	 that	 ship	 faced	 the	 perfect	 storm:	 The	
euro	 area	 almost	 caused	 the	 ship	 to	 sink,	 there	was	massive	
disagreement	on	how	to	get	out	of	the	storm,	and	it	was	unclear	
who	 was	 steering	 the	 ship.	 However,	 Euro-Europe	 eventually	
managed	to	buoy	the	ship	while	in	the	eye	of	the	storm,	and	the	
decisive	action	by	ECB	President	Mario	Draghi,	arguably	not	the	
captain	of	the	ship,	managed	to	steer	the	common	project	away	
from	imminent	danger.
Yet	 the	 journey	 is	not	 over.	And	 the	boat	 is	not	 as	 solid	 as	 it	
should	 be.	 Therefore,	we	must	 pose	 the	 question:	Were	 Euro-
Europe	to	face	yet	another	storm,	would	it	be	resilient	enough	
to	weather	it?
This	is	the	topic	of	our	report.	We	believe	that	further	repairs	are	
needed.	And	we	believe	that	Europe	needs	to	be	better	prepared	
for	the	next	potential	threat	to	its	very	existence.
Therefore,	 we	 suggest	 taking	 a	 very	 systematic	 look	 at	 what	
needs	to	be	done,	which	questions	we	need	to	answer	to	make	
improvements	to	the	common	project	(the	“known	unknowns”),	
and	what	a	possible	path	towards	renovation	could	look	like.
We	 want	 neither	 to	 sound	 alarmist	 and	 pessimistic	 nor	 join	
those	who	dream	about	changing	the	very	nature	of	the	common	
project	 into	 something	 far	 beyond	what	 it	 is	 today.	While	 the	
idea	 of	 an	 “ever	 closer	 union”	 clearly	 is	 the	 broad	 guideline,	
we	do	not	think	that	endless	debates	on	“finalité”	will	resolve	
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today’s	urgent	questions.	What	Europe	needs	today	is	a	positive	
and	pragmatic	debate	on	which	specific	steps	to	take.
Our	report	aims	at	setting	the	stage	for	this	kind	of	debate.	We	
have	worked	 on	 it	 as	 two	 think	 tanks	 because	we	 are	 struck	
by	 the	 absence	 of	 this	 question	 in	 governmental	 circles	 and	
the	media.	There	seems	to	be	an	extensive	“crisis	fatigue”	and	
“euro	area	debate	 fatigue”.	This	 is	understandable,	given	how	
aggressively	the	crisis	dominated	headlines	in	recent	years.
But	 the	simple	 fact	 that	 the	storm	has	subsided	doesn’t	mean	
that	our	boat	is	stable.	And	it	does’t	mean	that	another	storm	is	
not	on	the	horizon.
So	let	us	get	to	work	now.
Henrik	Enderlein
Jacques	Delors	Institut,	
Berlin
Joachim	Fritz-Vannahme
Bertelsmann	Stiftung,	
Gütersloh
8Executive summary 
The proposal: A Roadmap and a 
Modernisation Pact
•	 	The	Roadmap:	We	propose	a	three-phase	reform	plan	to	be	
implemented	over	a	period	of	approximately	10	years	 that	
includes	obligations,	incentives	and	avenues	for	withdrawal	
for	 all	 euro-area	 member	 states.	 Loosely	 inspired	 by	 the	
three	 stages	 in	which	 the	 euro	 itself	was	 introduced,	 this	
plan	 foresees	 the	 following	 three	 phases:	 (1)	 agreement	
on	 reforms	 and	 convergence	 goals;	 (2)	 implementation	
of	 reforms;	 and	 (3)	 introduction	 of	 a	more	 integrated	 and	
resilient	EMU	featuring	 improved	 institutions	 that	prevent	
imbalances,	strengthen	automatic	adjustment	mechanisms,	
offer	a	clear	crisis-resolution	framework	and	prevent	moral	
hazard.	
•	 	The	Modernisation	Pact:	 In	 recognition	 that	any	 long-term	
reform	process	lacking	immediate	benefits	will	be	politically	
difficult,	 we	 propose	 introducing	 a	 concerted	 investment	
initiative	on	the	EU	level,	which	would	include	the	mobilisation	
of	private	capital.	Designed	to	address	Europe’s	investment	
gap	and	modernise	its	infrastructure,	this	pact	would	mark	
a	 shift	 in	 policy	 towards	 greater	 cooperation	 among	 euro-
area	member	 states.	 By	 committing	 to	 the	 reallocation	 of	
public	spending	away	from	public	consumption	and	towards	
investment	 (i.e.,	 “smart	 austerity”),	 participating	 countries	
would	increase	their	fiscal	sustainability.	
The problem: Europe’s economic and 
monetary union (EMU) is not viable in the 
long run
•	 	Although	 the	 first	wave	of	 the	euro	area’s	economic	crisis	
has	receded,	this	is	no	time	for	complacency.	The	European	
Union	 remains	 threatened	 by	 low	 levels	 of	 investment,	
sluggish	reforms,	persistent	tensions	between	EU	members	
and	an	erosion	of	EU	legitimacy.
•	 	The	dynamics	driving	the	crisis	in	2009	were	a	direct	result	
of	 EMU’s	 paradoxical	 establishment	 as	 a	monetary	 union	
within	a	heterogeneous	economic	space.	These	underlying	
dynamics	 remain	 largely	 unchanged	 and	 can	 therefore	
generate	further	crises.	
The objectives: Repair and prepare
•	 	Europe	needs	to	repair	the	economic	and	political	damage	
wrought	by	the	ongoing	euro	crisis	and	prepare	for	future	
shocks.	 We	 propose	 a	 framework	 for	 an	 effective	 reform	
process	and	identify	priorities	in	need	of	further	exploration.	
•	 	In	 addition,	 we	 present	 a	 series	 of	 proposals	 designed	
to	 address	 and	 overcome	 the	 commitment	 problems	 and	
political	 deadlock	 that	 have	 stymied	 earlier	 attempts	 at	
reform.
Executive summary 
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Next steps: dealing with the “known 
unknowns”
•	 	One	 major	 objective	 of	 this	 study	 is	 to	 identify	 areas	
where	current	knowledge	and	expertise	 is	not	 sufficiently	
developed	to	guide	policymakers	towards	the	right	decisions.	
We	therefore	identify	several	areas	where	further	research	
is	needed:
	 a.	 	The	 nature	 of	 the	 required	 convergence:	 How	 much	
deepening	of	the	single	market	 is	needed?	What	kinds	
of	structural	reforms	are	needed	at	the	domestic	 level?	
What	instruments	can	ensure	convergence?
	 b.	 	The	 building	 blocks	 of	 a	 “true”	 EMU:	What	 additional	
elements	 would	 EMU	 need	 to	 allow	 it	 to	 function	
effectively	 even	 in	 a	 crisis?	How	 could	 the	 democratic	
legitimacy	of	such	a	new	framework	be	ensured?	
	 c.	 	The	 legal	 implications:	 Would	 a	 treaty	 change	 be	
required?	 What	 relationship	 would	 exist	 between	 the	
single	market	and	the	single	currency?	
	 d.	 	The	ability	to	leave	the	euro	area:	As	further	integration	
will	 necessitate	 some	 kind	 of	 compliance	mechanism,	
could	 euro-area	 exit	 be	 an	 option	 if	 certain	 member	
states	failed	to	comply?
	 e.	 	The	Modernisation	 Pact:	What	 are	 the	 highest-priority	
investment	 areas?	 What	 is	 the	 best	 way	 to	 mobilise	
private	capital	for	investment?	Who	could	or	should	lead	
an	investment	initiative?
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(1)	 a	 debt	 and	 investment	 gap,	 (2)	 a	 reform	 gap,	 and	 (3)	
waning	EU	legitimacy.	
The dangers of complacency
High debt levels and investment gap
6.	 	Without	growth	drivers,	 the	euro	area	as	a	whole	 is	 likely	
to	remain	on	a	low-growth	path.	The	private	sector	finds	it	
difficult	 to	 invest	 due	 to	 the	 bleak	 economic	 outlook,	 and	
banks	 are	 reluctant	 to	 lend	 because	 of	 their	 high	 level	 of	
exposure	 to	nonperforming	 loans.	At	 the	same	time,	 fiscal	
consolidation	in	the	countries	hit	hardest	by	the	crisis	has	
left	 little	 room	 for	 public	 investment.	 This	 combination	 of	
anemic	 demand	 and	 difficulties	 on	 the	 supply	 side	 has	
served	 to	 paralyse	 the	 economy,	 which	 in	 turn	 makes	 it	
harder	for	states	to	attain	a	sustainable	debt-to-GDP	ratio	or	
to	bring	down	unemployment	rates.	The	long-term	effects	of	
such	dynamics	are	even	more	worrying.	A	country	with	low	
levels	of	public	and	private	investment	not	only	experiences	
low	levels	of	present	economic	activity,	but	also	fails	to	lay	
the	 foundations	 for	 future	 growth.	 It	 risks	 falling	 behind	
its	 competitors	 in	 key	 areas	 such	 as	 infrastructure	 and	
education.
Reform gap and distrust 
7.	 	One	widely	discussed	way	out	of	the	vicious	cycle	of	debt	is	
structural	reform	that	raises	potential	growth	rates.	However,	
under	 difficult	 economic	 conditions,	 governments	 find	 it	
increasingly	 difficult	 to	 overcome	 resistance	 to	 potentially	
Recent developments
1.	 	During	the	past	two	years,	the	immediate	dangers	presented	
by	the	euro-area	crisis	have	seemed	to	recede.	A	combination	
of	emergency	 relief	packages,	 reforms	and	Mario	Draghi’s	
pledge	 to	 do	 “whatever	 it	 takes”	 to	 save	 the	 euro	 area	
stabilised	the	situation	to	such	an	extent	that	a	breakup	of	
the	common	currency	no	longer	appeared	to	be	an	imminent	
threat.	
2.	 	In	 recent	 weeks	 and	 months,	 however,	 the	 situation	 has	
started	 to	 deteriorate	 again.	 One	 could	 argue	 that	 the	
complacency	created	by	the	easing	of	the	crisis	pressure	has	
already	started	to	backfire.	
3.	 	Positive	signals	remain.	Risk	premiums	on	sovereign	bonds	
are	low	throughout	the	euro	area,	unemployment	rates	are	
high	but	gradually	decreasing,	 and	 the	 first	 steps	 towards	
a	banking	union	have	lowered	the	risks	posed	by	the	bank-
sovereign	nexus.	
4.	 	However,	no	full-fledged	recovery	is	 in	sight.	Growth	rates	
are	not	rising	quickly	enough.	The	euro	area’s	GDP	is	still	
below	pre-crisis	levels,	as	is	the	investment	rate.	Public	and	
private	debt	levels	remain	very	high.	Popular	discontent	is	
rising	quickly,	as	was	visible	 in	the	spring	2014	European	
Parliament	elections.
5.	 	In	sum,	the	crisis	has	given	rise	to	economic	and	political	
developments	 that,	 if	 left	 unchecked,	 pose	 a	 grave	 threat	
to	European	prosperity	and	stability,	both	in	the	short	and	
medium	term.	Three	developments	are	especially	worrying:	
A. Background: The crisis is not over
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alienation	 and	 ever-increasing	 euroscepticism	 among	 a	
large	 part	 of	 society.	 The	 “lost	 generation”	 of	 unemployed	
youth	in	Spain,	Italy	and	Greece	are	in	danger	of	becoming	
not	just	a	lost	opportunity	in	economic	terms,	but	a	threat	to	
the	political	system	that	has	disappointed	them.	
Our approach
9.	 	This	study	takes	stock	of	the	euro	area’s	problems,	draws	up	
a	Roadmap	towards	a	solution	and	identifies	the	most	urgent	
questions	that	have	to	be	solved	on	the	way	there.	There	are	
numerous	proposals	for	the	individual	building	blocks	that	
make	up	a	solution,	even	if	some	crucial	questions	appear	
unanswered.	What	 is	needed	now,	 especially	when	 taking	
into	 account	 the	 tight	 electoral	 calendar,	 is	 a	method	 that	
shows	how	the	blocks	could	fit	together,	sets	out	priorities	
and	 points	 out	 the	 main	 gaps	 in	 knowledge	 (“known	
unknowns”).
The priorities: Repair and prepare
10.		In	 order	 to	 put	 a	 definite	 end	 to	 the	 crisis,	 Europe	 needs	
to	 pursue	 two	 overarching	 goals.	 First,	 it	 needs	 to	 repair	
the	 massive	 economic	 and	 political	 damages	 wrought	 by	
the	crisis,	and	second,	the	euro	area	needs	to	eradicate	its	
systemic	weaknesses	and	prepare	 for	 future	shocks.	 In	 its	
current	form,	EMU	is	not	viable	in	the	long	run.	The	current	
crisis	has	pushed	it	to	its	limits,	and	the	next	one	may	tear	it	
apart.
painful	 reforms.	 The	 situation	 is	 today	 further	 complicated	
by	mutual	recriminations	between	euro-area	member	states,	
which	 are	 born	 from	 “solidarity	 fatigue”	 in	 some	 countries	
and	 “reform	 fatigue”	 in	 others.	 Rescuing	 the	 euro	 area	 is	
increasingly	 seen	 not	 as	 a	 common	 European	 project	 with	
large	potential	gains	for	both	sides,	but	as	a	zero-sum	game.	
	 	This	rift	is	deepened	by	the	prominence	of	intergovernmental	
politics	in	the	debate	over	euro-area	rescue	measures.	Some	
of	the	euro	area’s	core	countries	are	perceived	to	be	behaving	
as	“political	rating	agencies,”	which	provokes	resentment	in	
the	debtor	 countries.	Populist	parties	across	 the	 continent	
have	 been	 able	 to	 capitalise	 on	 these	 sentiments	 and	 are	
likely	to	increase	their	influence	further	if	there	is	no	change	
of	approach.	
Waning legitimacy
8.	 	The	 prolonged	 crisis	 is	 also	 affecting	 citizens’	 attitudes	
towards	 the	 European	 Union.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	
asymmetric	adjustment	witnessed	by	Europe	in	recent	years,	
countries	 that	 tried	 to	 regain	 competitiveness	have	had	 to	
engineer	 a	 large	 and	 painful	 internal	 devaluation.1	 Such	
severe	 economic	 hardship	 would	 undermine	 confidence	
in	 any	nation-state’s	political	 system,	but	 it	 could	have	 an	
even	more	deleterious	effect	on	the	European	Union.	Since	
the	 EU	 relies	 heavily	 on	 output	 legitimacy,	 high	 levels	 of	
unemployment	 and	 prolonged	 recession	 are	 likely	 to	 fuel	
1	 	Symmetric	adjustment,	that	is,	a	devaluation	in	deficit	countries	accompanied	by	
a	simultaneous	revaluation	in	surplus	countries,	would	imply	less	severe	cuts	to	
prices	and	wages,	and	ultimately	a	 less	pronounced	economic	downturn	 in	 the	
deficit	 countries.	 See	 Grauwe	 (2012)	 on	 asymmetric	 adjustment	 and	 Schraad-
Tischler	and	Kroll	(2014),	Tressel	et	al.	(2014)	for	empirical	evidence.
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the	Roadmap	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	Modernisation	Pact	
that	focuses	on	smart	debt	reduction	and	a	coordinated	
investment	initiative.
	 •	 	Moreover,	 the	 study	 identifies	 “known	 unknowns,”	
thereby	 providing	 a	 clearer	 view	 of	 questions	 that	
need	to	be	answered	as	Europe	moves	towards	a	more	
resilient	monetary	union.	We	outline	which	areas	need	
to	be	researched	in	more	detail.
The structure
13.	 	This	 study	 is	 structured	 as	 follows:	 In	 chapter	 two,	 we	
describe	 why	 EMU’s	 current	 framework	 is	 vulnerable	
to	 crisis,	 and	 propose	 a	 set	 of	 policies	 and	 institutional	
elements	designed	to	increase	its	resilience.	Chapter	three	
and	 four	 discuss	 the	 implementation	 of	 these	 elements.	
They	also	 identify	questions	 that	need	 to	be	addressed	by	
further	research	before	the	reform	process	can	move	on.	
The principles
14.	Our	approach	is	governed	by	the	following	principles:	
	 •	 	What	is	needed	at	this	stage	is	not	(yet)	an	inquiry	into	
the	technical	content	of	certain	reforms	or	the	detailed	
institutional	 construction	 of	 tomorrow’s	 monetary	
union.	Rather,	 the	objective	of	 this	study	 is	 to	propose	
a	structure	for	the	reform	process	itself,	and	to	identify	
priorities	for	further	research.	
11.	 	More	specifically,	Europe	needs	to	improve	the	instruments,	
institutional	 framework	 and	 governance	 of	 EMU	 while	
simultaneously	accomplishing	four	tasks:
	 •	 Increasing	growth
	 •	 Reducing	debt
	 •	 Modernising	economies	through	investments
	 •	 Modernising	economies	through	structural	reforms
	 	Contrary	to	what	is	often	said,	these	goals	are	not	mutually	
contradictory.	Rather,	they	can	complement	and	strengthen	
each	other	if	implemented	in	the	right	way.	
How to get to resilience? Objective and 
limitations of this study
12.		What	Europe	needs	now	 is	 a	 comprehensive	vision	of	 the	
path	from	crisis	to	resilience	that	can	serve	as	a	guide	for	
concrete	action.	This	pilot	study	contributes	to	such	a	vision	
in	two	ways:
	 •	 	The	 study	 presents	 a	 working	 method	 that	 facilitates	
cooperation	 and	 commitment.	 It	 develops	 a	 Roadmap	
towards	a	sustainable	EMU,	based	on	reaching	the	four	
goals	 listed	 above	 in	 the	medium	 term.	 The	 idea	 is	 to	
build	strong	incentives	for	all	euro-area	member	states	
(as	well	as	willing	EU	member	states	outside	 the	euro	
area)	 to	 implement	 structural	 reforms	 and	 commit	
(perhaps	even	through	legal	obligations)	to	an	enhanced	
and	more	integrated	monetary	union.	In	recognition	that	
the	current	political	environment	will	render	difficult	any	
long-term	 reform	 process	 lacking	 immediate	 benefits,	
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	 •	 	The	debate	over	EMU	reform	should	not	be	burdened	by	
the	 broader	 debate	 over	 the	 ultimate	 end	 of	 European	
integration.	 Therefore,	 all	 reforms	 and	 changes	 need	
to	be	derived	 from	 the	principle	 of	 subsidiarity,	which	
can	be	rephrased	as:	“As	much	additional	integration	as	
necessary	 for	 the	 effective	 functioning	of	EMU,	but	 as	
little	as	possible	given	this	constraint.”2
	 •	 	All	 euro-area	 countries	 would	 be	 required	 to	 commit	
political	 capital	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 agreed-
upon	measures.	 In	return,	 they	could	expect	 the	same	
of	 others	 (“quid	 pro	 quo”)	 and	 enjoy	 the	 benefits	 of	 a	
strengthened	monetary	union,	including	a	more	efficient	
response	to	future	crises.
2	 Cf.	Enderlein	et	al.	2012.
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How MMU contributed to the crisis
18.	 	This	creation	of	a	monetary	union	within	a	heterogeneous	
economic	 space	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	 number	 of	 problematic	
dynamics	that	have	been	described	in	detail	elsewhere	and	
can	only	be	summarised	here.4	In	short,	MMU	contributed	
to	 the	 crisis	 in	 three	 ways:	 It	 fostered	 the	 emergence	 of	
imbalances,	failed	to	facilitate	timely	adjustment	and	lacked	
an	efficient	crisis-response	mechanism.
Emergence of imbalances/vulnerabilities 
19.	 	The	creation	of	EMU	triggered	a	massive	flow	of	credit	to	the	
euro-area	periphery.	As	markets	discounted	the	default	risk	
of	periphery	government	debt	in	spite	of	the	no-bailout	clause,	
risk	 premiums	 plunged.	 Cheap	 financing	 opportunities	
spurred	 demand	 and	 inflation.	 While	 beneficial	 in	 the	
short	run,	 the	credit	boom	proved	to	have	 lasting	negative	
consequences.	 In	 a	 few	 countries,	 governments	 borrowed	
excessively,	undermining	the	resilience	of	public	 finances.	
In	 others,	 the	 additional	 funds	 inflated	 asset	 bubbles	 and	
encouraged	the	private	sector	to	take	on	debt.
20.		As	 inflation	 differentials	 persisted,	 the	 European	 Central	
Bank’s	 (ECB)	 unitary	 nominal	 interest	 rate	 became	 less	
suitable	for	individual	member	states.	
4	 	E.g.,	Lane	2006;	European	Commission	2008,	2012;	Enderlein	et	al.	2012;	Lane	
2012;	Rompuy	et	al.	2012;	Allard	et	al.	2013.
15.	 	This	chapter	illustrates	why	reform	efforts	should	focus	on	
the	architecture	of	Europe’s	EMU	by	analysing	the	roots	of	
the	euro	area’s	troubles.	It	provides	a	brief	overview	of	the	
causes	of	the	current	crisis	and	an	assessment	of	the	reforms	
undertaken	to	date.	We	argue	that	EMU	is	still	prone	to	crisis	
and	identify	a	set	of	concrete	measures	that,	if	implemented	
jointly,	would	substantially	strengthen	its	resilience.	
16.	 	Why	did	the	financial	turmoil	of	2008	–	2009	trigger	such	
a	deep	and	prolonged	crisis	 in	 the	euro	area?	 In	 line	with	
most	publications	on	 the	subject,	we	argue	 that	EMU	was	
especially	 vulnerable	 to	 external	 shocks	 and	 contagion	
because	 crucial	 elements	 of	 a	 sustainable	 currency	 union	
were	 missing.	 Most	 importantly,	 there	 was	 no	 political	
consensus	on	far-reaching	fiscal	and	economic	coordination	
when	 the	 negotiations	 over	 EMU	 reached	 their	 decisive	
phase	in	the	early	1990s,	even	though	the	Delors	Report	as	
well	as	most	academic	research	had	stressed	the	importance	
of	such	policies.3
17.	 	The	framework	agreed	upon	in	the	Maastricht	Treaty	could	
be	called	a	MMU.	It	introduced	a	common	currency,	but	was	
not	 itself	 an	 economic	 union.	 Governance	 was	 limited	 to	
little	more	than	a	budget	and	deficit	ceiling,	complemented	
by	 a	no-bailout	 clause	 that	was	meant	 to	 encourage	 fiscal	
responsibility.	
3	 	E.g.,	 Marzinotto	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Darvas	 2012;	 Enderlein	 et	 al.	 2012;	 European	
Commission	2012;	Allard	et	al.	2013.
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as	 “deficit	 economies”	 accumulated	 an	 unsustainable	
amount	 of	 foreign	 liabilities,	 while	 other	 euro-area	
member	states	ran	large	surpluses.7
Weak crisis response
23.		When	the	crisis	broke,	it	soon	became	apparent	that	the	
implications	of	EMU	membership,	namely	 the	absence	
of	 traditional	 adjustment	 tools	 such	 as	 exchange-rate	
devaluation,	hampered	member	states’	crisis	responses	
to	 a	 greater	 extent	 than	expected.	 In	 the	 absence	of	 a	
clear	 crisis-resolution	 mechanism,	 euro-area	 members	
spent	precious	 time	discussing	 fundamental	 questions	
about	 competences,	 process	 and	 institutions.	 In	 the	
meantime,	 markets	 lost	 confidence	 and	 the	 crisis	
spiraled	 out	 of	 control	 as	 economies	were	 caught	 in	 a	
vicious	cycle	of	bank	failures,	skyrocketing	public	debt	
and	faltering	growth.8
24.		The	 situation	 was	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 predominance	
of	 intergovernmental	 over	 supranational	 politics,	 and	
the	 consequent	 focus	 on	 national	 interests	 during	 the	
height	 of	 the	 crisis.	 Negotiations	 over	 conditionality	
and	 emergency	 assistance	 were	 charged	 with	 moral	
overtones	 that	 reflected	 the	 desire	 of	 politicians	 to	
appease	their	domestic	constituencies.	
7	 E.g.,	Blanchard	2007;	Allard	et	al.	2013.
8	 E.g.,	Merler	and	Pisani-Ferry	2012;	Shambaugh	2012.
	 	For	high-growth,	high-inflation	countries	such	as	Spain	and	
Ireland,	the	real	interest	rate	was	too	low,	and	provided	fuel	
to	 an	 already	 overheating	 economy.	 For	 low-growth,	 low-
inflation	 countries	 such	 as	 Germany	 and	 France,	 the	 real	
interest	rate	was	too	high,	depressing	growth	and	investment.	
Instead	 of	 mitigating	 economic	 volatility,	 monetary	 policy	
exacerbated	it	(the	“one	size	fits	none”	problem).5
Failure to adjust 
21.	 	Due	 to	 this	 incomplete	 economic	 integration,	 the	 real-
exchange-rate	channel	proved	too	weak	to	produce	a	timely	
adjustment	of	imbalances	within	the	euro	area.6	At	the	same	
time,	 the	 MMU’s	 rudimentary	 framework	 for	 cooperation	
did	not	encourage	the	use	of	(politically	costly)	anti-cyclical	
fiscal	policy.	Quite	to	the	contrary,	the	“three-percent-rule”	
of	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	tended	to	be	too	lax	in	good	
times	and	too	tight	in	difficult	ones.
22.		Self-reinforcing	 effects	 accelerated	 subsequent	 negative	
developments.	 Inflation	 differentials	 vis-à-vis	 the	 rest	 of	
the	euro	area	undermined	the	competitiveness	of	periphery	
countries’	tradables	sectors,	while	productivity	growth	was	
depressed	by	the	diversion	of	capital	away	from	productive	
investment,	 which	 in	 turn	 widened	 the	 current	 account	
deficit	 further.	Over	 the	 years,	 the	 countries	 today	 known	
5	 E.g.,	Enderlein	2005;	Lane	2006;	Bertola	2012;	Lane	2012,	2013;	Obstfeld	2013.
6	 	In	 a	 currency	 union	 with	 a	 strong	 real-exchange-rate	 channel,	 “high-inflation	
countries	 will	 ultimately	 face	 reduced	 external	 demand,	 whereas	 low-inflation	
countries	will	 improve	 their	 competitiveness.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 self-enforcing	
cyclical	phenomena	will	be	stopped	by	a	decline	(or	boom)	in	exports	caused	by	
the	real	appreciation	(depreciation)	of	the	exchange	rate.”	(Enderlein	et	al.	2012:	
16).	 See	Dullien	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 for	 an	 empirical	 study	 of	 the	 real	 exchange	 rate	
channel	in	the	euro	area.	
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Measured	by	 these	criteria,	 “the	euro	area	has	never	been	an	
‘optimum	currency	area’.”10	Although	member	states	are	closely	
connected	by	 internal	 trade	 ties,	 the	degree	of	 internal	 labour	
mobility	 and	 price	 flexibility	 is	 low,	 and	 the	 macroeconomic	
shocks	 experienced	 by	 member	 states	 are	 significantly	 more	
idiosyncratic	 than	 is	 true	 within	 a	 smoothly	 functioning	
currency	 union	 such	 as	 the	 United	 States.	 Contrary	 to	 initial	
expectations,	convergence	has	not	accelerated	markedly	since	
the	start	of	EMU.11	
10	 Enderlein	et	al.	2012:	15.
11	 	Bayoumi	and	Eichengreen	1992;	Frankel	and	Rose	1996;	Mongelli	2002;	Enderlein	
2005;	Lane	2006;	European	Commission	2008.
EMU and the “one size fits none” paradox
In	general,	the	benefits	of	a	currency	union	can	be	expected	to	
outweigh	its	costs	when	it	encompasses	a	homogeneous	economic	
area.	 Specifically,	 research	 on	 “optimum	 currency	 areas”	 has	
stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 synchronised	 business	 cycles	 and	
macroeconomic	shocks.	Business-cycle	synchronisation	can	be	
supported	by	a	high	degree	of	economic	openness,	a	high	degree	
of	capital	and	labour	mobility,	and	high	levels	of	price	and	wage	
flexibility.	Under	ideal	circumstances,	a	single	monetary	policy	
could	be	expected	to	be	equally	suitable	for	all	members	of	the	
currency	union	–	an	idea	that	has	been	described	as	“one	size	
fits	all.”9	
9	 E.g.,	Mundell	1961;	McKinnon	1963;	Frankel	and	Rose	1996.
Figure 1: Inﬂation dispersion in the euro area, 1999–2013 
Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations.
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estimates	 an	 implicit	 net	 transfer	 from	 creditor	 to	 crisis	
countries	of	between	€43	and	€74	billion	per	year.	This	does	
not	 include	 “the	 potentially	 very	 large	 costs	 (longer	 crisis	
duration,	 lower	 output,	 and	 higher	 unemployment)	 that	
could	 be	 associated	with	 the	 current	 approach	 of	 ex	 post	
risk-sharing.”12	
12	 Allard	et	al.	2013:	25.
25.		Against	the	backdrop	of	a	slow	political	response	and	general	
uncertainty,	temporary	liquidity	problems	evolved	into	self-
fulfilling	solvency	crises	that	became	increasingly	costly	to	
address.	In	a	2013	study,	the	IMF	provides	an	approximation	
of	the	costs	of	an	ex	post	crisis	response	(as	opposed	to	ex	
ante	 crisis	 prevention)	 by	 calculating	 the	 implicit	 transfer	
payments	 that	 became	 necessary	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	
the	 crisis.	 The	 study	performs	 this	 task	by	 comparing	 the	
interest	rates	creditor	countries	charged	crisis	countries	with	
the	estimated	cost	of	alternative	financing;	it	consequently	
Figure 2: Net international investment position of selected euro-area economies, 1999–2013 
Source: Eurostat, authors' calculations.
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29.		Competitiveness:	Reforms	aimed	at	improving	productivity	
and	 lowering	unit	 labour	 costs	have	been	 introduced	with	
the	 aim	 of	 addressing	 the	 unsustainable	 foreign-liability	
positions	held	by	some	euro-area	member	states.	Efforts	in	
this	regard	have	thus	far	been	only	moderately	successful,	
according	to	recent	assessments.	Whatever	the	outcome	in	
the	long	run,	periodically	improving	competitiveness	cannot	
substitute	 for	 addressing	 the	 underlying	 destabilising	
dynamics	described	above.14
Imbalances and adjustment: Missing elements
30.		Completion	 of	 the	 single	 market	 and	 policy	 convergence:	
The	 most	 straightforward	 way	 to	 reduce	 imbalances	 is	 to	
strengthen	the	real-exchange-rate	channel	as	an	adjustment	
mechanism.	 This	would	 address	 the	 roots	 of	 the	 crisis	 by	
facilitating	 the	 transmission	 of	 price	 signals	 and	 moving	
EMU	closer	 to	an	optimal	currency	area.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	
is	crucial	to	address	the	structural	preconditions	for	a	truly	
integrated	common	market,	for	instance	by	increasing	trade	
in	services,	creating	a	harmonised	regulatory	environment	
and	 encouraging	 a	 higher	 degree	 of	 labour	 mobility.	 The	
Monti	 Report	 and	 the	 subsequent	 Single	 Market	 Acts	 I	
and	 II	 represent	 tentative	 steps	 towards	 deeper	 economic	
integration,	but	much	bolder	reforms	are	needed.15
31.	 	Business-cycle	 synchronisation:	 Since	 the	 real-exchange-
rate	channel	works	slowly	even	in	fully	integrated	economies	
such	 as	 the	 United	 States,	 adjustment	 can	 be	 supported	
14	 	E.g.,	Lane	2006;	Grauwe	2013;	Obstfeld	2013;	Wyplosz	2013;	Gabrisch	and	Staehr	
2014;	Tressel	et	al.	2014.
15	 E.g.,	Monti	2010;	Enderlein	et	al.	2012.
Have reforms addressed the most relevant 
issues?
26.		In	 recent	 years,	 European	 policymakers	 have	 embarked	
on	 numerous	 reforms	 intended	 to	 remedy	 some	 of	 the	
weaknesses	identified	above.	To	what	extent	have	they	been	
successful?	
Imbalances and adjustment: Policy action and 
evaluation
27.	 	Fiscal	 surveillance:	 Reform	 efforts	 have	 to	 date	 focused	
on	 the	 prevention	 of	 unsustainable	 budget	 deficits	 via	
measures	 such	 as	 the	 so-called	 six-pack	 and	 two-pack,	
and	 the	 Treaty	 for	 Stability,	 Coordination	 and	Governance	
(TSCG).13	These	reforms	have	aimed	at	contributing	to	crisis	
prevention	 by	 making	 country	 commitments	 stronger,	
thereby	 strengthening	 confidence	 in	 national	 solvencies.	
However,	 the	 examples	 of	 Spain	 and	 Ireland	 demonstrate	
that	initially	sound	public	finances	may	not	offer	protection	
against	a	sudden	interruption	in	financing	if	the	underlying	
current-account	imbalances	prove	too	large.	
28.		Macroeconomic	surveillance:	While	the	importance	of	private-
sector	imbalances	was	acknowledged	by	the	introduction	of	
the	Macroeconomic	 Imbalance	Procedure	 (MIP),	 the	extent	
to	which	member	states	are	in	fact	willing	and	able	to	comply	
with	its	recommendations	remains	to	be	seen.	
13	 	The	six-pack	is	a	set	of	EU	regulations	that	specify	the	budget	rules	and	sanction	
mechanisms	under	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact,	while	the	two-pack	enhances	
surveillance	of	EU	member	state	budgets.	The	Treaty	for	Stability,	Coordination	
and	 Governance	 (TSCG)	 is	 an	 intergovernmental	 agreement	 that	 introduces	
further	constraints	on	fiscal	policy,	including	a	debt	brake.
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common	deposit-insurance	 system,	 country	 risk	 still	 plays	
an	important	role	in	investment	decisions	during	crises.	Pro-
cyclical	 capital	 flows	 and	 vicious	 cycles	 tying	 banks	 and	
sovereigns	together	thus	remain	a	threat.
Crisis response: Missing elements
34.		Clear	 conditions	 for	 assistance:	 While	 European	
policymakers	did	manage	to	prevent	a	disorderly	exit	from	
the	euro,	this	success	carried	a	high	cost.	Relations	between	
euro-area	 member	 states	 have	 deteriorated	 markedly.	 As	
long	as	conditionality	is	negotiated	ad	hoc	and	under	great	
pressure	from	the	markets,	this	scenario	is	likely	to	repeat	
itself.	An	“ESM+”	model	that	sets	out	clear	conditions	under	
which	 troubled	 countries	 would	 be	 provided	 with	 access	
to	 finance	 (possibly	 in	 return	 for	 strict	external	budgetary	
surveillance	mechanisms)	would	provide	an	alternative.
35.		Enhanced	 legitimacy	 and	 credibility:	 Financial	 crises	
require	 quick	 and	 credible	 action.	A	more	prominent	 role	
for	the	Community	method,	including	majority	voting,	could	
help	guide	expectations	and	reduce	uncertainty	by	limiting	
the	number	of	veto	players.	As	decisions	often	touch	upon	
the	 budgetary	 sovereignty	 of	 member	 states,	 credibility	
and	 legitimacy	 would	 be	 strengthened	 by	 including	
parliamentary	delegates	in	the	process.	
through	 EMU-wide	 coordination	 of	 demand	 management.	
One	way	to	accomplish	this	would	be	to	institutionalise	anti-
cyclical	 fiscal	 transfers	 between	 euro-area	member	 states,	
thus	helping	to	synchronise	their	business	cycles.	Existing	
proposals	include	a	cyclical-shock	insurance	mechanism,	a	
Europe-wide	 unemployment-insurance	 programme,	 and	 a	
common	euro-area	budget.16	
Crisis response: Policy action and evaluation
32.		Emergency	assistance:	The	creation	of	the	European	Stability	
Mechanism	 (ESM)	 underlines	 European	 states’	 general	
determination	 to	 support	 euro-area	 members	 in	 financial	
distress,	thereby	mitigating	the	risk	of	self-fulfilling	solvency	
crises.	Nevertheless,	 the	 ESM	 is	 not	 based	 on	 a	 principle	
of	 joint	 and	 several	 liability,	 and	 requires	 unanimity	 for	
decisions	to	provide	stability	support	(Article	5	ESM	Treaty).	
These	features,	which	were	created	in	the	difficult	political	
context	of	the	crisis,	render	the	ESM	vulnerable	to	political	
deadlock	and	delays,	and	thus	run	the	risk	of	compromising	
its	potential	to	reduce	uncertainty.	
33.		Limit	 contagion:	 The	 creation	 of	 a	 banking	 union	marked	
a	 milestone	 in	 efforts	 to	 limit	 the	 risk	 associated	 with	
the	 link	 between	 banks	 and	 sovereigns,	 thus	 preventing	
fragmentation	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 in	 times	 of	 crisis.	
However,	the	Single	Resolution	Fund	(SRF)	is	small	compared	
to	banks’	balance	sheets,	and	the	use	of	ESM	resources	as	
a	backstop	 is	subject	 to	numerous	constraints.17	Moreover,	
several	commentators	have	argued	that	in	the	absence	of	a	
16	 E.g.,	Marzinotto	et	al.	2011;	Enderlein	et	al.	2013;	Dullien	2014.
17	 E.g.,	Pisani-Ferry	et	al.	2013.
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Looking	 back	 at	 the	 challenges	 identified	 in	 this	 and	 the	
preceding	 chapter,	 we	 can	 identify	 a	 set	 of	 needed	 reforms	
whose	 joint	 implementation	would	 address	 the	most	pressing	
issues	 (see	Table	1).	 These	will	 guide	us	 in	 the	proposals	we	
develop	in	the	following	chapters.
When	 talking	 about	 reforms,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 differentiate	 not	
only	by	policy	area,	but	also	by	objective.	A	first	set	of	reforms	
comprises	measures	 to	 restore	EMU	and	 its	member	states	 to	
their	pre-crisis	dynamism	and	prosperity	(“repair”).	However,	in	
order	to	ensure	resilience	in	the	long	run,	these	policies	need	to	
be	complemented	by	a	second	set	of	reforms	aiming	at	ensuring	
the	crisis	does	not	repeat	itself,	for	example	by	completing	the	
banking	union	(“prepare”).
Chapter conclusion: What is needed to make 
EMU viable? 
While	 the	 euro	 crisis	 has	 resulted	 in	 significant	 reforms,	 they	
have	thus	far	focused	primarily	on	combatting	symptoms	of	the	
crisis,	 not	 its	 causes.	 Large-scale	 imbalances	 are	 still	 likely	 to	
emerge,	 adjustment	 remains	 slow	and	emergency	assistance	 is	
still	vulnerable	to	delays.	As	a	consequence,	uncertainty	prevails	
and	Europe	is	fighting	a	protracted	crisis	that	is	expanding	from	
the	economic	into	the	political	realm.	
What	is	to	do?	In	order	to	make	EMU	viable	in	the	long	run,	Europe	
needs	 to	 address	 its	underlying	problems	and	 simultaneously	
repair	 the	damage	 the	 crisis	has	already	wrought.	Otherwise,	
the	euro	area	may	implode	before	 long-term	reforms	can	have	
an	impact.	
Table 1: Synopsis of the repair and prepare approach
Objective
Policy area
Repair Prepare
Political-institutional •  Enhance EU legitimacy (see §35)
•  Reduce tensions between EU members (see §7)
•  Address national populism (see §7)
•  Complete ESM (see §34)
•  Complete banking union (see §33)
•  Enhance policy convergence (see §30)
•  Ensure business-cycle synchronisation (see §31)
Economic •  Complete structural reforms (see §7)
•  Reduce debt (see §6)
•  Close investment gap (see §6)
•  Complete the single market (see §30)
•  Modernise economies (see §29) 
•  Enhance monetary transmission (see §33)
Source: Authors
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	 •	 	Efficient	 adjustment	 mechanisms	 that	 would	 prevent	
large	imbalances	between	euro-area	member	states	from	
arising,	for	example	by	strengthening	the	real-exchange-
rate	 channel	 and	 synchronising	 the	business	 cycles	 of	
euro-area	member	states.
	 •	 	A	clear	crisis-prevention	and	resolution	framework	that	
reduces	 uncertainty	 and	 limits	 contagion,	 for	 example	
by	 encouraging	 fiscal	 responsibility	 and	 ensuring	 the	
credibility	of	assistance	schemes.	
The way to TEMU: A three-phase Roadmap
39.		While	 there	 may	 be	 widespread	 agreement	 on	 the	 need	
for	 these	 two	 components,	 little	progress	has	 in	 fact	 been	
made	 towards	 them	since	 the	 introduction	of	 the	banking	
union.	The	debate	is	often	described	as	an	impasse	caused	
by	 incompatible	 preferences	 between	 a	 “northern	 bloc”	
of	 countries	 favoring	 fiscal	 consolidation	 and	 structural	
reforms,	 and	 a	 “southern	 bloc”	 of	 countries	 demanding	
increased	 focus	 on	 mutual	 insurance	 mechanisms	 and	
investments.	 Each	 party	 is	 hesitant	 to	 concede	 to	 the	
demands	of	 the	other,	as	 it	would	thereby	weaken	its	own	
leverage.	
40.		However,	 as	 we	 would	 like	 to	 argue,	 the	 perception	 of	
reform	as	a	zero-sum	game	is	incorrect.	EMU	would	in	fact	
be	 strengthened	 if	 a	 combination	 of	 these	 “northern”	 and	
“southern”	 positions	 were	 to	 be	 implemented,	 and	 would	
offer	all	participants	long-run	benefits	related	to	reform	and	
risk-sharing.	The	key	 issues	are	credible	commitment	and	
Characteristics of a TEMU
36.		As	argued	in	the	previous	chapter,	Europe	needs	to	improve	
EMU	governance.	The	goal	is	to	construct	a	monetary	union	
able	to	cope	with	endogenously	arising	imbalances	as	well	
as	 exogenous	 shocks.	 We	 call	 such	 a	 currency	 union	 a	
TEMU.	TEMU	constitutes	a	pragmatic	way	of	addressing	the	
shortcomings	of	MMU,	not	a	general	call	for	“more	Europe.”	
It	should	include	as	much	integration	as	necessary	to	make	
monetary	union	work,	but	 as	 little	 as	possible	within	 this	
constraint.18
37.	 	At	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 debate	 over	 the	 optimal	 design	 for	
resilient	currency	union	lies	a	disagreement	about	the	right	
balance	between	incentives	and	sanctions.	Some	argue	that	
incentives	cannot	ensure	lasting	compliance	with	the	rules,	
and	instead	promote	free	riding.	Others	reply	that	sanctions	
are	equally	problematic	since	they	might	harden	domestic	
resistance	 and	 can	 act	 as	 a	 deterrent	 only	 if	 they	 are	
enforced	–	something	that	has	proven	exceedingly	difficult.	
The	ultimate	sanction,	exit	or	expulsion	from	EMU,	has	so	
far	been	a	taboo,	and	 it	 is	still	unclear	 to	what	extent	 this	
may	change.	
38.		The	goal	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 outline	possible	 elements	of	
TEMU,	while	acknowledging	that	much	further	research	is	
required	 to	 develop	 a	 full	 picture.	 Indeed,	 there	 is	 ample	
disagreement	in	Europe	today	as	to	what	would	constitute	a	
“true”	or	“genuine”	economic	and	monetary	union.	However,	
the	need	 for	 several	 core	 elements	 is	 largely	uncontested.	
Two	such	elements	are:
18	 For	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	this	principle,	see	Enderlein	et	al.	(2012:	21).
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phases:	 (1)	 setting	 targets	 for	 structural	 convergence,	 (2)	
implementation	of	reforms,	and	(3)	the	start	of	TEMU.	
43.		A	key	difference	in	this	 initiative	as	compared	to	previous	
efforts	 would	 be	 the	 use	 of	 positive	 incentives	 instead	
of	 sanctions.	 Policies	 that	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 dictated	
by	 external	 actors	 enjoy	 little	 support	 within	 domestic	
populations,	and	are	likely	to	be	reversed	or	diluted	over	time	
if	they	are	implemented	at	all.19	They	provide	fertile	ground	
for	populist	electoral	victories,	which	in	turn	make	further	
reforms	harder	to	implement.	Conversely,	the	use	of	positive	
incentives	increases	domestic	ownership	of	reforms.	
44.		In	contrast	 to	 the	debate	over	contractual	arrangements	and	
the	Convergence	and	Competitiveness	Instrument,	the	three-
phase	approach	offers	a	clear	focus	on	a	stronger	real-exchange-
rate	channel	and	avoids	the	pitfalls	of	financial	incentives.	Its	
focus	lies	on	a	common	effort	by	all	member	states	(including	
Germany),	and	thus	provides	a	positive	vision	for	EMU.20
45.		As	 an	 additional	 incentive	 for	 countries	 struggling	 with	
high	budget	deficits,	the	Commission	could	make	clear	that	
efforts	 to	 reach	 the	 agreed-upon	 indicators	 will	 be	 taken	
into	account	when	considering	the	setting	and	extension	of	
budget-deficit	reduction	deadlines.
46.		For	 each	phase,	we	will	 provide	 a	 brief	 description	 of	 the	
main	elements,	followed	by	a	discussion	of	the	most	relevant	
“known	unknowns.”	
19	 E.g.,	Grüner	2013.
20	 	The	proposal	of	Rubio	(2014)	to	overhaul	the	Convergence	and	Competitiveness	
Instrument	points	in	a	similar	direction.
timing.	 As	 advocates	 of	 fiscal	 consolidation	 have	 argued,	
governments	have	an	incentive	to	renege	on	reform	promises	
as	soon	as	the	economic	pressure	eases,	implementing	only	
those	 measures	 that	 are	 politically	 expedient	 in	 a	 given	
situation,	and	thereby	undermining	the	effectiveness	of	the	
entire	system.	At	the	same	time,	the	developments	described	
in	the	introductory	chapter	of	this	study	amply	illustrate	that	
a	blunt	attempt	to	push	through	further	reforms	under	the	
threat	 of	 sanctions	 or	 a	 cessation	 of	 assistance	 would	 be	
politically	dangerous,	if	it	were	feasible	at	all.	
41.	 	Looking	 back,	 Europe	 faced	 a	 similar	 challenge	 in	 the	
1990s.	It	was	clear	that	monetary	union	required	a	degree	
of	convergence,	but	credible	commitment	was	an	issue.	The	
problem	was	solved	by	agreeing	on	a	set	of	indicators	and	
fixed	goals	that	would	constitute	the	minimum	requirements	
for	joining	EMU.	This	combination	of	clear	goals	and	a	strong	
incentive	proved	extraordinarily	successful.	Over	the	course	
of	the	1990s,	inflation	rates,	budget	deficits	and	debt	levels	
converged	at	an	unprecedented	pace,	even	in	those	countries	
that	ultimately	failed	to	comply	with	the	Maastricht	criteria	
in	full.
42.		We	propose	the	introduction	of	a	Roadmap	loosely	inspired	
by	this	run-up	to	the	euro.	The	idea	would	be	to	create	strong	
incentives	for	all	countries	to	implement	structural	reforms,	
consolidate	public	finances	and	commit	(even	through	legal	
obligations)	to	an	enhanced	and	more	integrated	monetary	
union.	In	return,	all	countries	that	complied	with	a	number	
of	 key	 requirements	 would	 be	 offered	 access	 to	 TEMU	
which,	in	turn,	provides	them	insurance	against	instability	
and	 self-fulfilling	 crises.	 The	 Roadmap	 consists	 of	 three	
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increased	cooperation	(see	below).	The	more	ambitious	the	
scope	of	the	reform,	the	more	viable	would	be	phase-three	
institutions	offering	comprehensive	crisis	prevention	–	and	
vice	versa.
Phase 1: Setting targets for convergence. 
Objectives and time frame
47.	 	Europe	 needs	 to	 identify	 elements	 that	 can	 ensure	 a	
resilient	 monetary	 union,	 and	 devise	 suitable	 indicators	
to	 measure	 progress	 toward	 the	 related	 goals.	 Moreover,	
it	needs	to	agree	on	a	time	frame	for	 implementation.	The	
coordination	of	phase	one	should	be	a	major	focus	of	the	new	
Commission.	The	preparatory	measures	could	begin	as	early	
as	2015,	followed	by	negotiations	over	indicators	in	2016.
Preparatory measures
48.		In	a	first	step,	Europe	needs	to	identify	the	areas	in	which	
reform	and	common	standards	are	absolutely	vital	to	allow	
the	proper	functioning	of	EMU.	This	debate	has	not	yet	taken	
place	in	a	full	and	systematic	fashion,	and	is	needed	on	both	
a	domestic	and	a	European	level.	It	is	essential	to	emphasise	
that	all	countries	need	reforms.	Examples	of	areas	in	which	
reforms	are	necessary	include	the	completion	of	the	single	
market	(in	particular	for	services),	the	transmission	of	price	
signals	and	enhanced	labour	mobility	(see	box).	
Negotiations
49.		A	 second	 step	would	 feature	 negotiations	 on	 the	 issue	 of	
suitable	 indicators	 and	 time	 frames	 for	 reform.	 It	 would	
be	 essential	 for	 these	 to	 be	 clearly	 defined	 in	 a	 common	
agreement,	a	process	that	would	be	politically	challenging.	
In	 parallel,	 an	 agreement	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 phase	
three	 would	 be	 required,	 creating	 the	 incentives	 for	
24
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Structural	 reforms	 are	 important	 for	 adjustment	 to	 the	 extent	
that	they	improve	price	and	wage	elasticity.	However,	the	trade-
offs	 merit	 systematic	 consideration.	 Some	 authors	 warn	 that	
individual	economies’	comparative	advantages	are	 founded	on	
a	 set	 of	 complementary	 institutions	 such	 as	 wage	 bargaining	
systems,	industrial	relations	and	inter-firm	relations.21	Reforms	
that	 strengthen	 the	 functioning	 of	 EMU	 may	 simultaneously	
destroy	 complementarities.	 Further	 research	 should	 therefore	
analyse	whether	some	reforms	are	better	suited	than	others	to	
strengthening	the	real-exchange-rate	channel	without	harming	
vital	aspects	of	economic	coordination.	
It	may	also	be	fruitful	to	consider	the	viability	of	a	second	option:	
Instead	of	prescribing	specific	reforms	for	all	countries,	member	
states	could	address	their	weaknesses	through	whatever	policies	
were	 best	 suited	 to	 their	 country’s	 specific	 circumstances,	 as	
long	 as	 the	 aggregate	 result	 complied	with	 the	 requirements	
of	 TEMU.	 The	 debate	 over	 reform	 contracts	 offers	 some	
preliminary	ideas	as	to	what	such	a	mechanism	might	look	like.	
In	this	context,	it	would	be	crucial	to	develop	suitable	criteria	for	
judging	the	extent	of	a	country’s	“TEMU	compliance.”	
Key research questions:
•	 	How	much	further	deepening	of	the	single	market	is	needed?	
•	 In	what	areas	do	we	need	common	standards?
•	 	What	 policy	 instruments	 are	 best	 suited	 for	 fostering	
convergence?
•	 	How	can	the	monetary	transmission	mechanism	be	enhanced?
21	 E.g..	Hall	and	Soskice	2001.
Need for further research (I):  
Convergence and structural reform
Deepening the single market
Economic	theory	suggests	that	a	deepening	of	the	single	market	
could	play	a	central	role	in	efforts	to	strengthen	market-based	
adjustment.	 Further	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 assess	 the	 extent	
to	 which	 this	 is	 feasible	 in	 practice,	 and	 to	 determine	 what	
concrete	steps	would	need	to	be	taken.	Current	taboos,	such	as	
the	 full	 implementation	of	 the	 single	market	 in	 services,	may	
need	to	be	broken.
Since	a	genuine	single	market	requires	participating	countries	
to	 construct	 comparable	 structures,	 research	 is	 also	 needed	
on	 the	 question	 of	which	 areas	 are	most	 in	 need	 of	 common	
standards,	and	on	how	these	standards	could	best	be	enforced.	
Possible	areas	might	include	labour-market	standards,	taxation	
standards,	judicial	standards,	standards	on	pension	rights,	and	
standards	on	public-finance	rules.
Structural reform 
In	recent	discussions,	it	has	often	remained	unclear	that	structural	
reforms	–	that	is,	reforms	of	product	and	labour	markets	–	can	
serve	two	distinct	objectives:	They	may	increase	the	growth	rate	
at	the	national	level,	or	they	may	strengthen	the	real-exchange-
rate	 channel,	 resulting	 in	 a	 better	 functioning	 of	 the	 currency	
union.	It	is	the	latter	aspect	that	we	discuss	in	this	study.	
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Phase 2: Implementation of reforms
50.		During	this	phase,	the	reforms	would	be	implemented,	and	
monitored	 by	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	 euro-area	
summit,	and	the	Eurogroup	or	the	Economic	and	Financial	
Affairs	Council	(ECOFIN).	Joint	and	parallel	implementation	
of	 the	 reforms	 in	 all	 euro-area	 countries	 would	 offer	
advantages	in	several	regards:	
	 •	 	Clear	and	measurable	targets	channel	efforts	and	allow	
for	comparison.	Progress	towards	the	TEMU	convergence	
criteria	 could	 become	 the	 measure	 of	 successful	
economic	policy	for	the	public	and	the	markets,	creating	
pressure	to	achieve	the	agreed-upon	targets.
	 •	 	The	principle	of	“quid	pro	quo”	would	become	manifest.	
Each	country	would	 invest	 in	a	more	resilient	EMU	by	
addressing	 unpopular	 but	 important	 reforms.	 At	 the	
same	 time,	each	country	would	receive	a	 return	on	 its	
investment	 by	 profiting	 from	 the	 stability	 and	 growth	
resulting	from	coordinated	policies.
	 •	 	Popular	support	for	deep	reforms	would	be	strengthened	
by	a	simultaneous	targeted	economic	stimulus	provided	
by	the	investment	programme	outlined	in	chapter	4.
51.	 	The	details	 of	 timing	have	yet	 to	be	discussed,	 and	would	
depend	crucially	on	the	scope	of	the	reforms	agreed	in	phase	
one.	 The	 list	 of	 countries	participating	 in	TEMU	would	be	
decided	 at	 the	 end	 of	 phase	 two.	 In	 order	 to	 prevent	 any	
country	from	being	a	formal	part	of	EMU	but	not	a	part	of	
TEMU,	this	list	should	be	regarded	as	final.	The	high	costs	of	
•	 	How	much	can	labour	mobility	contribute	to	adjustment,	
and	how	can	it	be	promoted?
•	 How	much	structural	convergence	is	necessary?
•	 	What	 is	 the	 right	 balance	 between	 ensuring	 a	 high	
degree	 of	 adjustment	 capacity	 and	 protecting	 the	
complementarities	of	existing	economic	structures?
•	 	Which	elements	would	need	to	be	included	in	a	“TEMU	
compliance	indicator”?
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the	current	crisis	have	made	it	unlikely	that	EU	policymakers	
will	make	the	same	mistakes	as	in	the	run-up	to	EMU,	and	
be	overly	forbearing	with	countries	that	have	failed	to	fulfil	
their	commitments.	
Need for further research (II):  
Non-compliance and exit
The	creation	of	TEMU	will	result	in	a	stronger	monetary	union	
only	 if	 all	 its	members	 comply	with	 the	 agreed-upon	 criteria.	
Consequently,	we	need	to	think	systematically	about	options	for	
those	countries	that	are	unwilling	to	participate	in	the	process	
or	are	unable	to	implement	it.	A	residual	minimalist	monetary	
union	 is	 undesirable,	 since	 it	 would	 complicate	 governance	
further	 by	 effectively	 splitting	 the	 European	Union	 into	 three	
parts:	 TEMU,	 an	 MMU	 and	 countries	 that	 have	 retained	 a	
national	currency.	
It	is	therefore	important	to	consider	feasible	options	for	an	exit	
from	EMU,	although	any	such	step	would	need	to	be	regarded	as	
a	last	resort	after	a	long	and	transparent	process	(thus	avoiding	
“surprise	exits”).	
Further	thought	must	also	be	given	to	the	creation	of	a	system	
encouraging	 compliance	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 TEMU.	 This	 might	
include	regular	reviews	and	“traffic	light”	indicators	that	would	
make	reform	progress	easily	visible,	for	example.	
Key research questions:
•	 	How	can	it	best	be	ensured	that	countries	either	join	TEMU	
or	exit	the	euro	rather	than	remaining	in	today’s	MMU?
•	 What	would	an	effective	review	process	look	like?
•	 Is	a	fixed	deadline	for	TEMU	accession	needed?
•	 	What	might	an	option	for	orderly	exit	from	EMU	look	like	and	
what	sort	of	sequence	should	be	employed	in	introducing	it?	
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emergency	liquidity	on	the	basis	of	predefined	conditions.	
Moral	hazard	could	be	limited	by	making	assistance	above	a	
certain	threshold	subject	to	increasingly	intrusive	external	
budgetary	 surveillance.	 The	 ESM+	 could	 also	 provide	 the	
backstop	for	the	banking	union’s	SRM.
56.		An	agreement	 could	also	be	 reached	 to	deal	with	existing	
debt	 (legacy	 debt)	 while	 making	 sure	 that	 future	 debt	
increases	remain	limited	under	the	new	TEMU	frame-work.	
Proposals	on	how	to	achieve	this	abound,	and	many	of	these	
could	be	adapted	for	integration	into	the	TEMU	framework.22	
57.	 	While	problematic	 structural	differences	are	 addressed	by	
the	 convergence	 process	 in	 phase	 one	 and	 two,	 cyclical	
differences	 are	 not.	 Temporary	 transfer	 payments	may	 be	
needed	 to	 synchronise	 TEMU	 members’	 business	 cycles	
and	prevent	the	emergence	of	imbalances	(see	chapter	two).	
This	 should	not	be	confused	with	permanent	mechanisms	
such	 as	 Germany’s	 fiscal	 equalisation	 scheme	 (“Länder-
finanzausgleich”),	 which	 is	 geared	 towards	 income	
convergence.	For	example,	a	cyclical	mechanism	based	on	
output-gap	deviations	could	result	in	net	transfer	payments	
close	 to	 zero	 in	 the	medium	 term	and	 could	 contribute	 to	
ensuring	 that	 the	ECB’s	monetary	policy	 does	not	 lead	 to	
divergent	inflation	rates	as	it	did	in	the	2000s.23
58.		Table	 2	 summarises	 possible	 TEMU	 building	 blocks	 and	
the	incentives	each	offers	in	terms	of	crisis	prevention	and	
contagion.
22	 	E.g.,	Brunnermeier	et	al.	2011;	German	Council	of	Economic	Experts	2012;	Pâris	
and	Wyplosz	2014.
23	 Enderlein	et	al.	2013.
Phase 3: Start of TEMU 
Objectives
52.		TEMU	must	offer	its	prospective	participants	clear	incentives	
to	 join.	 Plans	 for	 phase	 three	 therefore	 need	 to	 contain	
provisions	 for	strengthened	EMU	governance,	better	crisis	
resilience	and	stronger	structural	growth.	All	countries,	but	
in	particular	Germany,	will	have	to	think	about	what	kind	of	
enhanced	solidarity	(e.g.,	guarantees	or	temporary	transfers)	
and	improved	institutional	framework	they	would	be	willing	
to	 accept	 if	 others	 transfer	 in	 exchange	more	 sovereignty	
to	the	European	level.	The	message	should	be	that	the	new	
package	will	offer	genuine	advantages,	but	can	only	work	for	
countries	willing	to	engage	in	reform.
53.		Some	of	TEMU’s	benefits	would	derive	solely	from	reforms	
undertaken	by	its	members	prior	to	accession.	For	example,	
a	 high	 degree	 of	 convergence	 will	 result	 in	 gains	 related	
to	 trade	 and	 economics	 of	 scale,	 as	 well	 as	 an	 increased	
adjustment	capacity.	For	most	benefits,	however,	institutions	
must	first	be	created	or	reformed.	
Possible elements of TEMU
54.		A	 complete	 banking	 union	 would	 minimise	 the	 risk	 of	
financial-system	 fragmentation,	 strengthening	 the	 role	 of	
stabilising	capital	flows	during	periods	of	crisis.	This	would	
include	a	common	deposit-insurance	scheme	and	a	credible	
fiscal	backstop	for	the	Single	Resolution	Mechanism	(SRM).
55.		A	 European	 Monetary	 Fund	 or	 ESM+	 would	 protect	
its	 members	 against	 self-fulfilling	 crises	 by	 providing	
28
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Need for further research (III):  
The final stage of TEMU 
Compromise and lasting commitment
A	 successful	 compromise	 would	 need	 to	 provide	 significant	
incentives	 to	 the	countries	most	 in	need	of	 reform,	while	 still	
being	 acceptable	 to	 the	 countries	 taking	 on	 responsibility	 for	
their	peers.	While	the	choice	of	institutional	configuration	would	
Table 2: Incentives TEMU could offer to participating countries
Element Advantages for countries in a strong 
economic position
Advantages for countries under 
pressure
Crisis 
prevention
•  High degree of convergence
•   Strong real-exchange-rate 
channel
•   Automatic correction of imbalances 
without political crisis, high costs, 
mutual recriminations, etc. 
•   Prevents gradual competitiveness 
loss and painful sudden internal 
adjustment
•   Cyclical stabilisation •  EMU works as intended
•  No net transfers over the medium term
•   Will receive payments during cyclical 
downturns
•  Payments support reform efforts
•   Prevents divergences in inflation 
rates and competitiveness
Crisis 
response
•   ESM+/European Monetary 
Fund with streamlined 
voting system and clear rules 
(“sovereignty ends where 
liquidity ends”)
•   Provides stability but deters excessive 
deficits
•  No hostage situation
•  Makes self-fulfilling crises less likely
•   Conditions for emergency lending 
are known ex ante 
•  Less uncertainty on the markets
•   Complete banking union, 
including deposit-insurance 
scheme and credible 
backstop
•   Lower costs due to market failures and 
“too big to fail” situations
•   Panic and capital outflows become 
less likely
Source: Authors
inevitably	be	a	political	decision,	 further	research	can	provide	
the	 foundations	 for	 a	 constructive	 debate.	 Many	 calls	 for	 a	
fiscal	 or	 banking	union	have	been	bold	 in	 their	 demands	but	
vague	in	terms	of	details.	More	specific	information	on	possible	
elements	would	make	it	easier	to	identify	functional	equivalents	
of	contested	institutions.	It	would	also	reduce	uncertainty	with	
regard	to	possible	redistributional	effects.	
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Another	 as-yet	 unsolved	 issue	 concerns	 the	 incentives,	
positive	 or	 negative,	 that	 would	 be	 needed	 to	 keep	 countries	
from	backsliding	on	reform	commitments	after	 joining	TEMU.	
Previous	and	current	experiences	with	the	Stability	and	Growth	
Pact	 raise	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 credibly	
threaten	 large	member	 states	with	 sanctions,	 especially	 since	
an	exit	from	TEMU	should	not	be	an	option.
Interaction between institutions
Apart	 from	 political	 considerations,	 discussion	 regarding	
TEMU’s	necessary	and	desirable	institutional	architecture	needs	
to	 be	 informed	 by	 a	 comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 its	 economic	
implications.	We	need	a	clearer	understanding	of	how	elements	
such	 as	 a	 European	 Monetary	 Fund	 or	 a	 completed	 banking	
union	would	interact.	Additional	research	could	also	enable	us	
to	 make	 tentative	 statements	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	
the	alternative	paths	towards	a	viable	monetary	union:	stronger	
institutions,	economic	reform	and	transfer	payments.	
Monetary union and the single market
The	 optimal	 design	 of	 TEMU	 would	 depend	 strongly	 on	 its	
membership.	The	single	market	may	become	synonymous	with	
EMU	in	the	long	run,	but	while	the	euro	area	is	growing,	this	
trend	is	by	no	means	irreversible.	An	evaluation	would	need	to	
take	into	account	the	legal	considerations	discussed	below,	the	
United	Kingdom’s	 referendum	 in	 2017	 and	 the	 consequences	
of	a	possible	British	EU	exit.	It	would	also	have	to	address	the	
dynamics	 that	 could	 result	 from	 agreement	 on	 an	 ambitious	
Roadmap.
Key research questions
•	 	What	is	the	right	balance	between	incentives	for	economically	
strong	countries	and	those	for	countries	under	pressure?
•	 	To	 what	 extent	 can	 convergence	 and	 domestic	 reform	
realistically	 provide	 resilience,	 and	 where	 are	 institutions	
needed?	
•	 	Which	 specific	 solutions	 should	 be	 considered	 in	 dealing	
with	existing	and	future	debt?
•	 	Which	specific	solutions	should	be	considered	as	a	means	of	
completing	the	banking	union?
•	 	Which	 specific	 solutions	 to	 enhance	 business-cycle	
synchronisation	should	be	considered?
•	 	What	 rules	 would	 ensure	 that	 countries	 maintain	 TEMU	
compliance	over	time?	
•	 	How	 would	 the	 proposed	 institutions	 interact?	 Which	
institutions	would	usefully	complement	each	other	and	how?	
•	 	What	would	 be	 an	 appropriate	 role	 for	 transfer	 payments	
in	specific	TEMU	configurations?	Under	what	circumstances	
would	 temporary	 transfers	 need	 to	 be	 supplemented	 by	
permanent	ones?
•	 	What	political	dynamics	would	need	to	be	taken	into	account	
when	planning	the	creation	of	TEMU?
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Key research questions
•	 	What	elements	of	TEMU	could	be	 implemented	under	 the	
current	treaty?	What	are	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	
of	various	forms	of	treaty	changes?
•	 	In	 what	 order	 should	 legal	 and	 political	 questions	 be	
addressed	in	the	sequencing	of	the	debate?
•	 	What	 is	 the	 right	 balance	 between	 legitimacy	 and	
effectiveness	for	the	new	institutions?
•	 	What	kind	of	relationship	between	the	euro	area	and	the	rest	
of	the	EU	is	appropriate	and	sustainable?
Need for further research (IV):  
Legal implications
Due	 to	 the	 significant	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 EU	 treaty	
changes,	 the	 legal	 implications	 of	 a	 new	 TEMU	 framework	
would	be	of	major	importance.	An	inquiry	would	be	needed	to	
ascertain	whether	the	stronger	governance	needed	for	the	euro	
area	would	make	a	treaty	change	necessary.	Theoretically,	 the	
options	are	varied	and	 include	 implementation	within	current	
treaties,	the	passage	of	a	new	protocol,	a	small	treaty	change,	a	
large	treaty	change,	a	new	treaty	linked	to	current	ones,	as	well	
as	an	altogether	new	treaty	that	would	stand	outside	the	current	
framework.	Further	research	is	needed	to	evaluate	these	options	
and	their	feasibility	with	an	eye	towards	the	2017	election	year.
At	the	same	time,	a	fresh	look	at	possibilities	able	to	ensure	the	
legitimacy	of	the	new	institutions	is	needed.	Beyond	oversight	
through	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 the	 greater	 involvement	 of	
national	 parliaments	 merits	 consideration.	 Any	 sustainable	
solution	 will	 need	 to	 strike	 the	 right	 balance	 between	
effectiveness	and	legitimacy.	
Relationship between EMU and EU
A	 further	 topic	 for	 consideration	 is	 the	 approach	 to	 “ins”	 and	
“outs”	 –	 that	 is,	 euro-area	members	 and	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	
European	Union.	This	latter	group	has	proven	to	be	sceptical	of	
new	institutions	and	rules	for	the	euro	area,	as	exemplified	in	the	
debate	over	the	Fiscal	Compact.	Further	research	is	needed	into	
avenues	of	possible	compromise	between	the	two	groups,	and	on	
alternative	ways	of	implementing	stronger	euro-area	governance.
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•	 	In	the	most	severely	crisis-struck	countries,	crisis	fatigue	and	
legitimacy	issues	have	become	formidable	obstacles	to	any	
political	initiative	that	demands	sacrifices	in	the	short	run.	
A	strengthening	of	the	economy	is	needed	in	order	to	open	
up	 political	 space	 by	 checking	 populism	 and	 encouraging	
the	population	to	accept	further	reforms.	
Turning risks into opportunities: The 
Modernisation Pact
61.	 	We	propose	a	coordinated	programme	that	would	modernise	
Europe	 in	key	areas	and	prevent	political	deadlock.	 It	has	
the	 potential	 to	 turn	 the	 abovementioned	 risks	 into	 an	
opportunity	by	(1)	combining	an	immediate	economic	boost	
with	 lasting	value,	 (2)	putting	crisis	countries’	budgets	on	
a	sustainable	trajectory,	and	(3)	ensuring	the	credibility	of	
negotiated	promises.	In	the	following,	we	outline	the	basic	
elements	of	such	a	Modernisation	Pact,	and	consider	which	
aspects	 regarding	 its	 scope	 and	 implementation	 require	
clarification.	
Immediate boost and lasting value
62.		A	 number	 of	 recent	 publications	 show	 that	 Europe	 could	
greatly	 profit	 from	 increased	 public-	 and	 private-sector	
investment.25	A	coordinated	 investment	programme	would	
trigger	demand	effects	and	strengthen	business	confidence.	
It	could	thus	help	crisis-struck	countries	in	particular	to	sign	
up	to	a	continued	commitment	to	reform,	with	the	ultimate	
goal	being	TEMU	accession.	Investment	in	infrastructure,	in	
25	 E.g.,	DIW	2014;	International	Monetary	Fund	2014.
59.		Even	for	a	willing	government,	an	ambitious	reform	agenda	
such	as	the	one	sketched	above	would	be	hard	to	implement	
in	 the	current	political	 environment	 if	 it	did	not	 feature	a	
number	of	early	gains.	Therefore,	a	Modernisation	Pact	needs	
to	accompany	phase	one’s	negotiations	and	phase	two’s	first	
reform	efforts.	While	 the	Roadmap	aims	at	 enhancing	 the	
monetary	union’s	architecture,	this	pact	would	serve	to	guard	
against	 the	risks	that	 threaten	to	undermine	a	sustainable	
recovery.	 It	 may	 be	 particularly	 needed	 in	 Europe’s	 most	
crisis-damaged	 countries,	 but	 would	 ultimately	 benefit	 all	
euro-area	member	states.
The dangers of complacency revisited
60.		The	three	trends	that	were	initially	identified	as	dangerous	
to	the	European	project	as	a	whole	also	threaten	to	stymie	
efforts	to	improve	EMU	governance.	
•	 	A	lack	of	investment,	especially	with	regard	to	infrastructure,	
undermines	 future	 potential	 growth.24	 Europe	 is	 in	 need	
of	 a	 far-reaching	 infrastructure-investment	 plan,	 but	
governments	struggling	with	high	levels	of	public	debt	are	
reluctant	to	increase	spending.
•	 	Tense	 relations	 between	 euro-area	 governments	 hinder	
negotiations	 over	 bold	 European	 responses	 to	 the	 crisis.	
A	 stronger	 role	 for	 European	 institutions	 governed	 by	 the	
Community	method	may	be	necessary	in	order	to	shift	the	
focus	 of	 the	 debate	 from	 conflicting	 national	 interests	 to	
common	European	goals.	
24	 E.g.,	Fichtner	et	al.	2014.
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the	 current	economic	 conditions	due	 to	 its	 strong	positive	
effect	on	output.	But	even	countries	that	are	constrained	by	
fiscal	 rules	 and	market	 expectations	 can	 reasonably	 hope	
to	lower	debt-to-GDP	ratios	by	performing	a	budget-neutral	
reorientation	of	their	spending.27	
65.		For	maximum	effect,	the	initiative	would	depend	on	private	
savings,	which	are	available	but	need	to	be	mobilised.	The	
European	 level	 could	 play	 a	 major	 role	 here.	 Examples	
could	 include	 public-private	 partnerships,	 but	 also	 public	
guarantees	for	investment	in	certain	sectors,	as	well	as	the	
prospect	 of	 favourable	 tax	 treatment	 for	 specific	 actions.	
An	ECB	intervention	in	debt	markets	is	only	a	second-best	
solution.28
Credible commitment
66.		The	third	element	of	the	pact	would	be	credible	commitment.	
Investment	 is	 needed	 immediately,	 but	 the	 reduction	 of	
public	 consumption	 is	 feasible	 only	 over	 the	 medium	
term,	 and	 the	 completion	 of	 reforms	 would	 take	 years	 –	
which	is	one	of	the	reasons	why	earlier	attempts	at	“smart	
austerity”	have	 tended	 to	 result	 in	no	 austerity	 at	 all.	 The	
question	 of	 whether	 future	 governments	 can	 be	 expected	
to	honour	today’s	reform	pledges	would	be	decisive	for	the	
pact’s	effect	on	business	confidence,	as	well	as	its	political	
acceptability	in	countries	that	favour	fiscal	consolidation.29	
It	 would	 therefore	 be	 important	 to	 ensure	 the	 successful	
completion	 of	 the	 “smart	 austerity”	 programme	 through	
27	 E.g.,	Blanchard	and	Leigh	2013;	International	Monetary	Fund	2014.
28	 E.g.,	Fichtner	et	al.	2014;	Pisani-Ferry	2014.
29	 E.g.,	Dervis	2014.
the	broad	sense	of	the	word,	seems	an	especially	promising	
target	due	to	its	favourable	effect	on	future	growth.	Examples	
include	 information	 and	 communications	 technology,	 and	
specifically	 the	 high-speed	 Internet	 connections	 needed	
by	international	business;	a	European	energy	network	that	
could	result	in	positive	scale	effects	and	a	higher	resilience;	
and	 education	 capable	 of	 producing	 long-term	 social	 and	
economic	gains.
Debt sustainability
63.		In	 order	 to	 ensure	 the	 sustainability	 of	 euro-area	
governments’	 budgets	 even	 in	 the	 face	 of	 higher	 levels	 of	
investment	 expenditure,	 each	 country	 would	 pledge	 to	
engage	in	“smart	austerity.”	Usually,	governments	that	wish	
to	 reduce	 a	 high	 debt-to-GDP	 ratio	 face	 two	 alternatives:	
They	 can	 try	 to	 increase	 growth	 (which	 may	 increase	
spending)	or	they	can	reduce	spending	(which	may	reduce	
growth).	Under	pressure	by	the	markets,	most	have	recently	
chosen	the	second	option,	which	has	had	a	strongly	negative	
effect	 on	 investment.26	 The	 pact	 would	 instead	 compel	
governments	to	choose	a	third	way,	reorienting	fiscal	policy	
away	from	public	consumption	and	towards	investment.	This	
option	may	be	politically	challenging	because	it	would	likely	
include	cutting	expenditures	on	social	transfers	and	public-
sector	employees.	However,	it	is	much	more	likely	to	deliver	
sustainable	results	in	the	long	term.
64.		Investment	can	be	funded	in	part	by	a	more	expansionary	
fiscal	policy.	The	latest	IMF	World	Economic	Outlook	suggests	
that	debt-financed	investment	would	be	self-financing	under	
26	 E.g.,	Barbiero	and	Darvas	2014.
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Smart debt-reduction strategies
Before	 smart	 debt	 reduction	 can	 be	 put	 into	 practice	 on	 a	
European	level,	a	more	complete	picture	needs	to	be	developed	
concerning	the	implementation	and	effects	of	reorienting	public	
expenditure	from	consumption	to	investment.	Further	research	
needs	 to	 identify	 best	 practices	 and	 possible	 pitfalls,	 such	 as	
country-specific	structures	that	may	interfere	with	the	process.
Institutional aspects 
The	 institutional	 dimension	 of	 the	 Modernisation	 Pact	 also	
requires	 further	 thought.	 Who	 would	 coordinate	 and	 lead	
the	 initiative?	 Commentators	 have	 alternately	 suggested	 the	
European	 Commission,	 the	 European	 Investment	 Bank	 and	
a	 new	 agency	 created	 specifically	 for	 the	 purpose.30	 These	
candidates	differ	not	only	with	regard	to	institutional	capacity,	
political	weight	and	experience	in	identifying	viable	investment	
opportunities;	 the	 choice	 of	 leadership	 would	 also	 influence	
how	much	 room	 for	 independent	action	would	be	accorded	 to	
individual	member	states	within	the	programme.	
30	 E.g.,	Fichtner	et	al.	2014;	Szczurek	2014.
measures	such	as	making	 this	one	of	 the	requirements	of	
accession	to	TEMU.	For	countries	currently	under	review	by	
surveillance	mechanisms	such	as	the	MIP	or	the	Excessive	
Deficit	Procedure	(EDP),	the	economic	boost	provided	by	the	
pact	should	be	an	opportunity	to	engage	in	reforms.	
Need for further research (V):  
The Modernisation Pact
Since	the	start	of	the	euro	crisis,	numerous	investment-initiative	
proposals	 have	 been	 brought	 forward,	 including	 a	 plan	worth	
€300	billion	by	the	president-elect	of	the	European	Commission,	
Jean-Claude	 Juncker.	A	 common	weakness	 of	 these	 plans	has	
been	their	vagueness.	
Clear focus areas
The	multiple	goals	of	the	Modernisation	Pact	make	it	essential	
that	 it	 be	 carefully	 designed.	 Before	 it	 can	 be	 implemented,	
further	research	needs	to	(1)	estimate	a	realistic	goal	for	overall	
investment	that	can	serve	as	a	benchmark;	(2)	identify	priority	
areas	to	enable	targeted	spending,	based	on	criteria	such	as	the	
impact	of	investment	on	long-term	growth	and	the	added	value	
from	coordinated	European	action;	and	(3)	clarify	what	sources	
of	private	financing	the	initiative	aims	to	mobilise,	and	design	
policy	instruments	accordingly.
34
D.  Connecting the short and the medium term: The Modernisation Pact
If	 the	 investment	 programme	 were	 to	 include	 a	 fiscal	
expansion,	more	 thought	 is	needed	on	how	higher	budget	
deficits	 could	 best	 be	 reconciled	 with	 the	 EU’s	 rules	 on	
fiscal	 governance.	 The	 options	 include	 a	 more	 generous	
interpretation	 of	 the	 flexibility	 provided	 in	 the	 existing	
rules,	a	rule	change	that	allows	for	higher	investment	levels,	
and	 a	 financing	 model	 that	 lies	 outside	 the	 budget	 caps,	
perhaps	through	the	European	Investment	Bank.31	
Key questions:
•	 How	large	is	the	need	for	investment?
•	 	What	 areas	 would	 benefit	 most	 from	 a	 coordinated	
European	investment	initiative?
•	 How	can	private-sector	financing	be	maximised?
•	 	What	concrete	steps	are	necessary	on	the	way	to	smart	
debt	reduction?
•	 	Who	 would	 serve	 as	 the	 best	 coordinator	 for	 the	
Modernisation	Pact?
•	 	How	could	the	investment	initiative	be	reconciled	with	
the	EU’s	current	fiscal	rules?
31	 	For	a	review	of	the	flexibility	offered	by	current	rules,	see	Fernandes	(2014),	
Micossi	and	Peirce	(2014).
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67.	 	In	the	current	context,	focusing	on	procedural	priorities	rather	
than	on	the	end	goals	of	longer-term	integration	could	be	the	
right	way	forward.	This	pilot	study	has	outlined	how	a	clear	
Roadmap	towards	TEMU,	inspired	by	the	process	of	accession	
to	the	euro,	could	provide	the	framework	for	a	combination	of	
reform,	investment	and	institutional	improvements.	
68.		Our	 approach	 recognise	 the	 importance	 of	 credible	
commitment	as	the	basis	for	cooperation,	but	also	takes	into	
account	the	lack	of	realism	in	demanding	complete	reforms	
as	a	precondition	for	investment	and	support.	The	euro	area	
is	at	a	point	where	meaningful	change	can	only	come	from	
within	the	economies	most	affected,	and	external	pressure	
may	do	more	harm	than	good.	Our	proposal	therefore	relies	
primarily	 on	 incentives,	 not	 on	 sanctions.	 It	 would	 mark	
a	 change	 in	 policy	 towards	 a	 more	 cooperative	 approach	
among	 euro-area	 member	 states,	 visible	 both	 in	 methods	
and	 goals.	 Thus,	 the	 study	 aims	 to	 reconcile	 demands	 for	
reform	 and	 fiscal	 sustainability	 with	 calls	 for	 increased	
investment	and	risk-sharing.
69.		Further	research	is	needed	on	(1)	the	nature	of	the	required	
convergence	 and	 structural	 reforms,	 (2)	 options	 enabling	
exit	from	EMU	if	desired	or	required,	(3)	the	final	stage	of	
EMU,	(4)	the	legal	framework	required	for	implementation	
of	the	Roadmap,	and	(5)	the	exact	investment	priorities	and	
financing	instruments	to	be	used	in	the	Modernisation	Pact.	
70.	The	table	below	summarises	our	overall	approach.	
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Table 3: Summary of the proposal
Time-
frame
Proposal
Content
Roadmap Modernisation Pact
2015–16
Phase 1:  
Setting of targets for 
structural convergence  
(see §47–49) In parallel:
Investment programme, 
but with ongoing 
reduction of debt levels 
(§59–66)
Begin discussion of reform contract. What reforms in which 
countries are needed to enable a better-functioning EMU? 
Message: All countries need reforms (even Germany). Also, how 
much policy convergence is necessary to make EMU work?  
What investments are most needed to modernise European 
economies?
2016–21
Phase 2:  
Implementation of 
reforms (§50–51)
The joint and parallel implementation of reforms in all euro-area 
countries would have clear advantages:
(1)  Dynamics similar to EMU accession: clear targets would 
channel efforts, increase peer pressure
(2) Principle of quid pro quo becomes clear
(3)  Reform efforts supported by economic stimulus derived from 
investment programme
2022 
onwards
Phase 3:  
Start of TEMU (§52–58)
This is the “carrot.” The content of the package would be 
determined by discussion, but must include strong incentives. 
Likely components include: completed banking union, enhanced 
ESM, completed single market. The main question needs to be 
answered by Germany: How much integration and solidarity 
is acceptable? The objective is clear: The compromise needs to 
envisage a TEMU that features strengthened governance, better 
crisis resilience and a basis for stronger structural growth. 
Source: Authors’ research 
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